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Multinational corporations represent an enormous concentration of  economic 
power in  the  United  States and the  rest  of  the  world.  U.S.  multinationals 
themselves account for sales of $3.5 trillion and control assets of $4.2 trillion, 
which  is  almost  60  percent  of  total  U.S. business  assets. They occupy a 
dominant  position  in  world  trade.  U.S.  parents  and  their  affiliates,  for 
example, are associated with 79 percent of U.S. exports and 46 percent of U.S. 
imports; they alone account for about  18 percent of world trade.‘ 
How might the presence of such large multinationals affect the behavior of 
the exchange rate? The typical  business executive would  probably  find this 
question easier to answer than the economic theorist. The executive  would 
probably point out that there has been a revolution  in international financial 
markets over the last decade. Securitization, globalization, innovation, and 
deregulation  have resulted  in  an explosion  of  new  instruments  and trading 
volume. The structure of multinationals’ liabilities have changed dramatically, 
and  today’s investment projects  are financed  in ways  that  were difficult to 
imagine only a few years ago. The executive’s view might be that the real-time 
fungibility of financial resources in today’s hectic markets may, in the large, 
make  exchange  rates  less  manageable,  more  volatile,  and  increasingly 
unpredictable.  He would probably add that the undisciplined behavior of  the 
dollar during the  1980s has done nothing to assuage his concerns. 
The source of  these  concerns  probably  lies  more  in the  role  of  corporate 
financial innovations than in the role of  “multi”  nationals-companies  which 
manage production facilities in more than one country. Naturally, multinationals 
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are major players in international financial markets by virtue of their size and 
global orientation. But most observers would agree that the impact of financial 
innovation  would  not disappear if  all multinationals  were  suddenly restruc- 
tured as wholly owned domestic corporations. Nevertheless, the prospect that 
currencies as well as a host of other financial variables are not well behaved 
is legitimate and worthy of more study. 
In section 8.1 of this paper, we focus on the exchange rate effects of financial 
market  innovations  used  by  large  corporations. We  begin  by  showing  that 
firms’ choices of capital structure have no effects on exchange rates if capital 
markets are perfect. Thus, observers concerned that financial innovations have 
contributed to excessive exchange rate volatility must base their arguments on 
capital market imperfections. We consider several ways in which international 
capital markets may in fact be quite imperfect:  incomplete integration, high 
costs of  transacting, and irrationality on the part of  investors. 
We  then argue there is no evidence that the kinds of  financial innovations 
that  firms have put  to use  for project  financing make exchange rates  more 
volatile  or difficult  to control.  While there  is mixed  evidence on whether 
exchange rates are “excessively”  volatile,  firms’ financial managers  do not 
appear to be culpable. Indeed, the evidence that we do have suggests that, if 
anything, corporations trading at long investment horizons, rather than shorter 
speculative horizons, help to stabilize exchange rates. Policy proposals aimed 
at discouraging heavy trading and high volatility, such as “Tobin”  and interest 
equalization taxes on foreign exchange transactions, do  not usually distinguish 
between different motives for trading. To the extent that these taxes ignore such 
distinctions,  they may be throwing the financial market innovation baby out 
with its bathwater. 
The  business  executive’s  second  answer  to  how  multinationals  affect 
exchange rates would be the economic theorist’s first: through the return on 
real investments in different countries. There is, however,  little literature on 
the  effects  of  multinational  investment  on  exchange rates.  The reason  is 
simple: the modern theory of the multinational as pioneered by Hymer (1976) 
and Kindleberger  (1969) has no special implications for exchange rates or 
international  capital  flows.  Under  their  “economic-organizational”  view, 
firms engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) in order to internalize  what 
would  otherwise be market transactions.  A host country  firm may be more 
valuable under the control of the foreign parent than under anyone else because 
of imperfections in the goods or factor markets, economies of scale and scope, 
the  difficulties in writing  perfect  licensing  contracts, etc. Notice  this  inter- 
pretation of ownership and investment  is completely  agnostic on the way  in 
which the host country assets are purchased. The capital need not flow in from 
the  parents’  home country or from  investors  anywhere abroad.  It  can  be 
borrowed just as easily in the host country. 
There is, however,  an older,  classical  trade  literature  on  multinationals 
which sought to explain foreign direct investment through international capital 
flows.  Under  this  view-which  Caves (1982) calls the “capital-arbitrage’’ 309  Multinational Corporations, Exchange Rates, and Direct Investment 
explanation-multinationals  act as a conduit for capital flows, and thus have 
a well-defined role in exchange rate determination. So it might be sensible to 
study  the  effect  multinationals  would  have  on  exchange  rates  under  this 
scenario. To the extent that the cost of capital is influenced by monetary policy, 
fiscal spending, and taxes, this view would lead to precise implications  for 
domestic and international policy. Unfortunately,  this view has several basic 
problems  and has largely  been  discarded. It does not  explain  why  foreign 
capital should flow into direct as opposed to portfolio investment. It also does 
not  explain  why  rates  of  return  are  unequal  in  the  first  place,  why  the 
international capital market would ever be in disequilibrium. 
Today, most international economists subscribe to Hymer’s (1 976) view of 
FDI, dismissing the empirical importance of the capital arbitrage view. We shall 
not argue here  with the need to model  foreign direct  investment  more as a 
problem in industrial organization than as a problem in international finance. 
Yet some recent research suggests a sense in which the older, capital arbitrage view 
of FDI may be realistic and of  increasing importance from a policy perspective. 
In  the section  8.2 of  this  paper,  we  argue that  technological  progress, 
combined with multinationals’ unique ability to move international capital, has 
made  multinationals  more  important  in  determining  international  capital 
flows.  Imperfections  in capital markets which  previously  were  regarded  as 
small  may  now  elicit  large  movements  of  capital.  Changes  in  corporate 
taxation, in  particular,  may  have  substantial  effects on both the  level  and 
composition of international capital flows, and to a more limited extent, the 
exchange rate. The new mobility of multinationals implies that subtle changes 
in incentives can significantly alter behavior. 
These  issues  are  particularly  relevant  for  the  United  States,  which  is 
currently thought  to be experiencing a large inflow of foreign direct invest- 
ment. We look at evidence which suggests that incentives for direct investment 
by foreigners  and incentives for foreign investment  by  domestics have been 
altered substantially by tax changes in the 1980s.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(TRA), for example, may help explain the current surge in foreign FDI in the 
United  States  as well  as  the  less  well  advertised (but  equally  significant) 
increase in U.S. FDI abroad. In terms of welfare effects, we cannot evaluate 
whether the 1986 TRA was a good thing. We can say, however, that given the 
current tax law, U.S. taxpayers benefit from the increase in foreign FDI, which 
effects a transfer of  resources from foreign taxpayers to the U.S. Treasury. 
We  conclude  in  this  section  that  the  presence  of  astute  and  informed 
multinationals poses a new challenge to policymakers. We are rapidly leaving 
behind an era in which it was acceptable to design tax policy without regard 
for the effects of FDI incentive and currency value. 
8.1  Multinational Financing and Exchange Rates 
In this section we explore how financial innovation affects firms’ financing 
decisions, and how these financing decisions in turn affect exchange rates. 310  Kenneth A. Froot 
In order to establish a way to think about this problem, we first examine the 
effects  of  financial  market  innovation  under  the  assumption  that  capital 
markets are perfect.  (We discuss below just what  we mean by  “perfect.”) 
Under these conditions we show that Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, hereafter 
MM) first proposition implies that changes in firms’ capital structures should 
have no effect on exchange rates. We then discuss evidence which suggests that 
international  markets  are not  perfect,  and  that  the  MM proposition  fails. 
Specifically,  we  address the  concerns of  those  observers who  argue  that 
financial innovations have had adverse effects on exchange rate volatility. We 
argue that the most  important financial innovations  for large firms are new 
markets  for  securitized  corporate  borrowing  and  security  swaps.  These 
facilitate trading at longer horizons.  We then review, but find no evidence to 
support,  the  hypothesis  that  these  particular  innovations  have  tended  to 
destabilize exchange rates. 
MM’s famous proposition  1 demonstrates the irrelevance of a firm’s choice 
of  debt and equity in a perfect capital market. The logic of their irrelevance 
proposition is, however, very general, and does not apply only to simple debt 
and  equity  instruments.  *  The  proposition  applies  to  any  combination  of 
financial  instruments,  no  matter  how  complex.  The  basic  intuition  for 
irrelevance is very simple: a firm cannot change the total value of its securities 
by splitting its cash flows into different  streams. The value of the whole is 
always equal to the  sum of  the values of  the parts-the  principle  of  value 
additivity. There is also a second, less obvious point in MM: the allocation of 
risk in the economy is independent of the firm’s capital structure, so that asset 
prices like the exchange rate are not affected by alternative financing schemes. 
To  see the logic of  this argument, consider an example in which financial 
innovations  have  made  it  possible  for  a  firm  to  issue  debt  in  different 
currencies. Specifically, consider an all-equity firm which can finance a fixed 
investment  project  with  debt denominated either in  dollars  or in  deutsche 
marks  (DM). The  market  value  in  dollars of  the  firm’s  securities  under 
dollar-debt finance is given by the market value of the equity plus the market 
value of the dollar debt V,  =  E,  +  D,.  Suppose an investor purchases 
the equity in this firm, spending E,  =  V, - D,.  He is then entitled to the 
profits  from the  investment  project  less  the  payments on the  dollar debt. 
For  simplicity,  assume that  the debt  is  sold to the  rest  of  the  world  for 
D, dollars. Figure 8.  la  shows the balance sheets for the firm, the investor, and 
the rest of the world, respectively. The equity and debt are purchased out of 
liquid dollar assets, L, and LRoW,  held initially by the investor and the rest of 
the world. 
Now suppose that an identical firm decides to issue debt in DM rather than 
in dollars (perhaps even a different dollar amount of DM debt). The market 
value in dollars of  the firm’s securities  is given by  V,,  =  Ed,,,  +  Ddm. 
Clearly, the cash flow generated by the firm’s equity will generally be different 
under  DM-debt  financing  than  under  dollar-debt  financing:  the  pay- 
offs from Ed,  will not equal those of  E,.  Under DM-debt financing, for any 31  1  Multinational Corporations, Exchange Rates, and Direct Investment 
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Fig. 8.1  Balance sheet implications of  foreign-currency financing 
given level of profits, an unanticipated appreciation of the mark relative to the 
dollar creates a windfall transfer to bondholders from shareholders. How does 
this particular capital structure affect the market value of the firm’s securities 
and the equilibrium exchange rate? 
To answer this, we assume that investors will pay the same amount of money 
for any two portfolios which provide exactly the same cash flow. If the investor 
purchases the equity only, he pays Ed, = V,,  -  D,,.  This would entitle him 
to the firm’s profits  as before, but  from those  profits  the payments  on the 
DM-debt will be subtracted. To  duplicate the payoffs from E$,  the investor 
must  also lend  the  equivalent of  D,,  dollars  in  DM, while  borrowing  D$ 312  Kenneth A. Froot 
dollars.  For this portfolio he must pay Ed,  +  D,,  -  D,  =  V,,  -  D,. 
Since this portfolio yields the firm’s profits less the dollar-bond payments, it 
has the same payoff as the dollar-financed equity above. Therefore it must also 
have the same cost: V,,,  -  D,  =  E,  =  V, -  D,.  But this implies that the 
total market value of the firm’s securities must be the same under both types 
of financing, v,,  = v,.~ 
Figure 8.lb shows the balances from these transactions. Notice  first that 
rest-of-the-world  (ROW) expenditures and  receipts  are  the  same  in  both 
figures. In figure 8.  la, ROW lends D, to the firm, whereas in figure 8.  Ib it 
lends D, to the investor. In 8.  1b  the investor in turn borrows dollars from ROW 
and lends marks directly to the firm. The investor thereby duplicates the future 
cash flows and current expenditures he had in figure 8.  la. Since investors and 
ROW  have the same expenditures and receipts as before, it follows that the firm 
must  receive  the  same  amount  of  cash  from  the  sale  of  its  securities: 
V,,  = V,. By lending marks and borrowing dollars, the investor has undone 
the firm’s change in financing. MM’s proposition  1, that investors will not pay 
a firm  to  do anything that  they  themselves can do, holds  across different 
currency denominations of debt financing. 
Another way of interpreting this result is to notice that the marketable assets 
of  the firm are all in zero net supply. The firm is short debt and equity to the 
extent that the rest of the private sector is long. Only the firm’s real investment 
projects,  which generate the cash flow, are in positive net supply. Regardless 
of how this cash flow is partitioned, the sum of the value of the parts is equal 
to the value of  the whole. 
The figures  suggest  more than  the indifference  of  firm  managers  to  al- 
ternative  capital structures.  MM  also implies  that  the  capital  market  equi- 
librium  is  completely  unaffected  by  alternative  means of  finance.  We  can 
see by comparing figures 8.  la  and 8.1  b that all real economic variables must 
remain the same. This follows because all three agents in the figures have the 
same current and future resources available to them in all states of nature. Thus 
exchange rate  expectations,  volatility,  risk  premiums,  forward  rates,  and 
borrowing and lending rates are unaffected. As long as the financial markets 
are perfect,  firm financing remains a veil, and has no implications  for real 
economic variables. 
In the discussion so far we have implicitly assumed that the investor prefers 
to purchase E, over Ed,.  In other words, he thinks that the added exchange 
rate exposure of E,  is worth paying for. There are two reasons why investors 
may  not  be  willing  to pay  much for this  exposure, why  they  may  be  ap- 
proximately  indifferent between E,  and Ed,,,. 
First,  if  exchange rate  risk  is purely  diversifiable  then  investors  are not 
willing to pay to avoid it. There is, of course, a large empirical literature testing 
the diversifiability of exchange rate risk. While several studies have found that 
a number of variables, such as forward rates and past exchange rate changes, 
appear to have predictive  power for exchange rate changes in excess of the 313  Multinational Corporations, Exchange Rates, and Direct Investment 
forward discount, there is little positive evidence that this predictive power is 
attributable to an exchange risk premi~m.~  Second, investors  may be indif- 
ferent between Es and Ed, even if exchange risk is not diversifiable as long as 
they  already  hold  optimal amounts of  currency risk.  Investors  might,  for 
example, hold the stocks of  foreign firms or hold foreign currency deposits 
directly. Once they have reached their optimal level of exchange rate exposure, 
investors’ marginal utility of small changes in exposure is zero. Figure 8.  lc 
shows the expenditures and receipts for all three agents when the firm issues 
DM-denominated  debt which is then purchased by ROW. If both our investor 
and ROW  already hold optimal levels of exchange rate exposure, then the value 
of  the  firm’s  securities  will  be  the  same  in  figure  8.  Ic  as  in  8.la 
(V, =  Vd,,,).  MM would therefore hold even if the debt swap depicted in figure 
8. lb were ruled out. 
Notice that investors could be satisfied with their exposure to exchange rates 
regardless of the size of the exchange risk premium. If risk premiums are large, 
then the first firms to provide diversification to investors would have been able 
to  extract  a  substantially  higher  price  for  their  securities, much  like  the 
innovative monopolist  who is first to sell a new product. But as other firms 
move to fill the gap, the excess returns to financial innovation disappear. A firm 
which can diversify cheaply-due,  for example, to low transactions costs- 
can gain by providing an unsatisfied  clientele of shareholders with additional 
diversification.  MM will  fail, but  this  activity  will  make  investors  better 
diversified and world capital markets more integrated. 
Before we go on to discuss the empirical shortcomings of MM, it is worth 
seeing  more formally  why  asset  valuations  do not  change as  long  as  all 
clienteles are satisfied. Suppose that asset markets are efficient and investors 
are  optimally  diversified.  Let  the  investor’s  utility  be  a  function  of  his 
next-period  consumption,  U  = U(c).  Suppose the  investor,  who  holds  N 
assets with real returns given by r,  . . .  rN,  sells an amount of the ith asset equal 
to a share dw, of his total wealth, and uses the proceeds to purchase a share 
dwj of  the jth asset,  where  dw, =  -dw,.  (To  continue with  the  previous 
example, we might think of the investor  selling a small amount of Ed, and 
using the proceeds to purchase E, of an identical firm’s stock.) Let investcr 
consumption  be  current  wealth  times  the  gross  return  on  the  portfolio, 
c = Ww’r, where W is total wealth, w is the N  X  1 vector of asset shares, 
and r is the N  x  1 vector of  gross returns. The requirement that the investor 
has set his portfolio optimally implies 
E[U’(rj  - r,)] = 0. 
At the optimum, the expected marginal gain from a self-financing swap of one 
asset for another is zero. 
It is easy to see that the capital market equilibrium remains efficient and that 
the consumption CAPM holds. As a result, the swap will not change asset 314  Kenneth A. Froot 
prices.  Suppose  that  rj  is  the  return  on  a  portfolio  of  assets  which  is 
independent  of  consumption and the returns  are normally distributed. Then 
equation (1) can be rewritten  ax5 
E (U”) 
E (Ti) - E (rj)  = -  (u,)  cov(r;,c). 
Because equation (2) holds for any asset or portfolio, it must also hold for the 
world market portfolio, om,  the shares of each asset in the world portfolio: 
(3) 
where rm,,  is the return  on the world  market  portfolio, deflated by  the  ith 
investor’s consumption price index. Combining equations (2) and (3)  yields 
the standard consumption CAPM for the investor: 
where 
A similar equation would hold for ROW: 
COV(I;,R~W~CR~W  1 
COV(~~,R~W~CR~W)’ 
P!.RoW  = 
All securities continue to be priced by the same rule as they were before the 
swap. If the investor and ROW were initially not at an optimum, equations (4) 
and (5)  would contain additional terms reflecting the swap of assets i andj  (i.e., 
[dU/dw,]dw,  + [dU/do,]dw,), and then there would be a first-order effect on 
equilibrium  prices.  But as long as equation (1) holds for all  investors, real 
required returns and the world capital market equilibrium are unaffected by the 
swap. 
We have obviously made several strong assumptions to get these results, and 
we focus on these below. First, we assumed that international capital markets 
are integrated.  By this we mean that all investors  are informed of  and have 
access to assets  traded  anywhere in  the world.  Second, we  assumed  that 
transactions costs are zero and that there are no taxes. And finally, we assumed 
that  the multinational’s  choice of  financing does not  affect  the value of  its 
investment project, an assumption  which we also relax below. 315  Multinational Corporations, Exchange Rates, and Direct Investment 
In spite of these unrealistic assumptions, the results above are very general. 
International asset pricing models are much more complicated than standard 
asset pricing models. They explicitly allow individuals in different countries 
to have different consumption baskets, and in any case, to use different nu- 
meraires to appraise real returns. Under these circumstances, the usual touch- 
stone  portfolios, such as the minimum-variance  portfolio and the mean-variance 
efficient portfolio, are no longer very useful for describing the world capital 
market equilibrium, since different investors will define them differently. The 
usual separation theorems will fail. Yet, in spite of this kind of heterogeneity 
across  investors,  the  above  example  and  model  continue  to  hold.  Small 
changes in the financial structure do not alter the allocation of resources, and 
therefore,  the world capital market equilibrium, no matter how complicated, 
remains unaffected. 
8.1.1  Financial Innovation 
Few economists would argue that the international capital market is perfect. 
Certainly, markets  were far from perfect  before  the last decade’s dramatic 
changes in the financial tools available to large firms. In this section we look 
briefly  at  how  financial  innovations  affect  firms’  costs  and  choices  of 
financing.6  Our interest  in  these  innovations  is to  see whether they  have 
eliminated important market segmentation  (by cutting transactions costs and 
reducing  regulations  and capital controls) and to  identify  new  instruments 
corporations use to hedge risks and finance investments. 
Twenty  years  ago  corporations  borrowed  predominantly  from  banks, 
usually  in domestic currency.  Transactions costs were higher  than they  are 
today. International bond and currency markets were essentially undeveloped. 
The domestic capital  markets  of  the largest developed countries (the U.S., 
Germany, France, Japan, and the U.K.)  were largely separated from each other 
by a variety of  capital controls. 
The growth of  the international currency market is a useful benchmark for 
the speed of financial innovation.  Transactions costs have fallen to the point 
where on an average day the difference between the bid and ask rates in New 
York on the DM is about 0.05 percent! In 1973, the average bid/ask spread fcs 
the DM was slightly more than twice as large, 0.11 percent. Over $250 billion 
changes hands  in currency markets  around  the world each day, roughly  an 
order of magnitude greater than a decade ago. Indeed, some observers express 
concern that there may now be “too”  much trade. Goodhart (1987) has found 
that only about 10 percent of daily trades in the foreign exchange market are 
between a bank and its customers, the remaining 90 percent are trades between 
banks. 
A number of restrictions in the 1950s and 1960s on capital flows affecting 
multinationals  stimulated the  growth of  the  Eurobond  market. Imposed  in 
1963, the U.S. interest equalization tax made it difficult for foreign affiliates 
of  U.S.  corporations and other foreign borrowers  to issue debt in the U.S. 316  Kenneth A. Froot 
market. After having issued $14 billion of debt on U.S. markets at low rates 
from 1946-63,  foreigners suddenly faced a cost-of-capital disadvantage in the 
U.S. market of 1 percentage point. In 1967 this was raised to 1.5 percentage 
points,  and new restrictions on U.S. capital outflows were added.’  The Eu- 
robond market sprung up in London and Luxembourg as a response to these 
regulations. In addition to providing a means for avoiding the interest equal- 
ization tax, these bonds were more attractive to lenders than comparable U.S. 
domestic bonds because they did not have to be registered. Lenders therefore 
found it easy to avoid all taxes on their Eurobond earnings. 
Volume grew quickly. Table 8.1 shows the growth of the international bond 
market, which includes both Eurobonds (bonds issued in a currency different 
from that of  the jurisdiction  of  issue) and foreign bonds (bonds issued by  a 
foreign source in the currency of the jurisdiction). Growth has been spectacular 
in every  year  except  that following  the  oil  shock in  1973, when the  U.S. 
interest  equalization  tax  was  removed  in  an  effort  to  assist  in  recycling 
petrodollars. This expansion of the international debt market is truly interna- 
tional, in that it is not limited to dollar-denominated borrowing. Table 8. l also 
shows that while  the denomination  of most securities is still the dollar, the 
share of international borrowing in DM, yen, and the pound has grown as well. 
The DM and  yen  together  have  gone from 3 percent  of  international  bor- 
rowing in  1981 to about 27 percent today. 
Throughout the late 1970s, U.S. corporate borrowers had to be enticed to 
issue their debt on the international market instead of on the domestic market. 
Table 8.1  New Issues in the International Bond Market (as  a percentage of 
U.S. domestic bond issues) 
International Bond Issues  Currency of Eurobond Issues 



























































































Source: World Financial Markets, various issues; Economic Report of  the President, 1988, table 
B-93; and Financial Market Trends, various issues. Data for 1987 are annualized from October 
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Perhaps as a consequence, the  interest  differential  between Eurodollar  and 
domestic dollar bonds was negative. As the market grew and borrowers became 
more familiar  with the Eurobond  market, the interest differential  narrowed 
steadily toward zero. Kidwell, Marr, and Thompson (1985) study these interest 
differentials, finding them to be in the range of 70- 140 basis points over the 
1977-81  period and 30-60  basis points in  1983, the end of their sample.' 
Figure 8.2 shows the differential between dollar-denominated corporate bonds 
in the U .  S . domestic and Eurobond markets. In 1984, the U .  S .  government lifted 
the 30 percent interest-withholding tax on the earnings of foreign investors. This 
granted U.S.  domestic bonds the same U.S. tax status asEurobonds, andmay help 
explain the fall in the interest differential in 1985 and  1986. 
Naturally, the fall in this interest differential could be a result of changes in 
required returns rather than improved financial integration. Evidence that these 
differentials  are due to segmentation comes from a study by  Kim and Stulz 
(1988). They argue that  Eurobonds are imperfect  substitutes  for domestic 
bonds from the lenders' point of view. When Eurobonds first became popular, 
purchasers wanted to hold more than were initially available, and therefore bid 
up  prices.  Firms  responded  slowly  to  this  unexpectedly  strong  demand. 
Because firms were able to raise capital relatively cheaply in this way, their 
stock prices increased when a Eurobond issue was announced. From 1979 to 
1984 the savvy corporate CFO was able to raise the value of his or her firm 
by  selling to an unsatisfied clientele of Eurobond purchasers. On this view, 
I 
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Fig. 8.2  Interest rate differentials: Eurobonds less domestic corporate bonds 318  Kenneth A. Froot 
MM failed, but only temporarily. As lenders became satisfied with the share 
of their portfolios  devoted to Eurobonds, the differential  fell. Today, CFOs 
cannot raise the value of their firm by issuing Eurobonds rather than domestic 
bonds; the clientele effects have disappeared. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence that the Eurobond market was initially seg- 
mented comes from arbitrage activities that firms have been able to engineer. 
In the early 1980s, Exxon bought $175 million of 30-year zero coupon U.S. 
Treasury bonds, and sold an offsetting amount of  Eurobonds for $200 million, 
earning an essentially riskless profit of $25 million. In early 1984, several other 
multinationals  issued foreign DM bonds and used the proceeds  to purchase 
German government securities  called  Schuldschein.  PepsiCo,  for example 
borrowed 250 million DM for ten years at 7.7 percent and then purchased 235 
million DM in ten-year Schuldschein yielding 8.35 percent. The Schuldschein 
were placed in an irrevocable trust to cover interest payments and principal on 
the new PepsiCo debt. The deal, called a “morning-to-midnight defeasance,” 
locked in a riskless profit worth approximately $2 million. The company was 
not even required to record the bonds on its balance  sheet. Soon after these 
deals  were  consummated, the  interest  differentials  that  made  the  arbitrage 
possible disappeared.’ 
To some extent, growth in international securitized borrowing has crowded 
out other sources of  borrowing. As a result of  “securitization,”  traditional 
bank  borrowing  has fallen dramatically  over the past  decade. Even though 
many U.S. corporations view the Eurobond market as a financing substitute 
for the U.S. domestic market, domestic debt issuance has also grown at a rapid 
rate. Indeed, recent growth has been large relative to the growth of  both GNP 
and equity financing,  as shown in table 8.2. 
Along  with  securitization  and  the  fall  in  transactions  costs has come an 
expanded  set  of  debt  instruments.  While  traditional  fixed-rate  debt  still 
dominates, floating rate bonds and convertible bonds now account for almost 
35 percent  of  total  international  issues.  The growth  of  these instruments is 
shown in table  8.3. In  addition, financial  futures  and  options have  grown 
quickly. While these instruments are redundant  in that  their payoffs  can in 
theory  be  duplicated  by  trading  other  instruments,  they  have  drastically 
reduced the costs of  executing many trading strategies. 
Perhaps the most  important and newest  instruments  available to multina- 
tionals are currency and interest rate swaps. These have changed the interna- 
tional capital market in two respects. First, they allow the hedging of  interest 
rate and exchange rate risk at horizons far longer than were previously possible 
on forward markets. Swaps therefore contribute to more efficient risk sharing. 
Second, swaps help reduce market segmentation. Swaps exploit the compar- 
ative advantage of  one firm’s ability to borrow  more cheaply  in one market 
compared with another firm, relative to both firm’s borrowing costs in a second 
market. To the extent that these borrowing differentials are due to local market 319  Multinational Corporations, Exchange Rates, and Direct Investment 
Table 8.2  Equity and Debt as a Fraction of  GNP 























































Source: Economic Report of  the President,  1988, tables B-93 and B-I. 
Table 8.3  New Issues on the International Bond Market (in billions of dollars) 
Instruments  1982  1983  1984  I985  1986  1987 
Fixed Rate  57.6  57.6  58.4  94.8  141.5  123.8 
Floating Rate and CDs  15.3  13.8  38.2  58.7  51.2  10.7 
Convertible  2.6  5.7  10.9  11.3  26.9  39.3 
-  -  5.4  6.2  3.5  Other  - 
Total  75.5  77.1  107.5  170.2  225.8  177.3 
Source: Financial Market Trends, various issues. 
differences in information or perception, swaps help reduce segmentation  in 
the international capital market. 
There is little data on swap volumes because swaps are an agreement between 
two parties and lack a clearinghouse  mechanism and because current accounting 
standards treat swaps as off-balance-sheet  transactions.  Outstanding currency 
swaps grew from zero in 1982 to about $100 billion at the end of  1986. The 
outstanding volume of  interest rate swaps is about three times larger. 
8.1.2  Financial Innovations  and Volatility 
Many observers see financial innovations  as reducing transactions costs, com- 
pleting markets, improving international risk sharing, and pushing authorities 
toward financial liberalization. lo Under this view, recent innovations  are closing 320  Kenneth A. Froot 
the gap between the real world and the idealized and frictionless capital market 
described in the examples above. The received wisdom is that innovations lu- 
bricate the market mechanism:  they are all for the better. 
Some obscrvers, however, question whether this traditional response is cor- 
rect. They ask whether easy access to trading has increased the volatility of ex- 
change rates without adding to their information content. We now turn to these 
arguments, highlighting the particular ways that corporations  have taken advan- 
tage of the revolution in international  finance. 
The long-held  Keynesian  view  that  asset  prices  do not  move  solely  in 
response to changes in fundamentals has received new attention over the last 
decade. A number of studies have asked whether asset prices move too much 
to be consistent  with  simple fundamentals models.  I’ Economists have also 
begun to study the effect on asset prices of  “noise  traders:”  investors who 
trade simply for the sake of trading, or who trade on what they (irrationally) 
believe to be valid  information.  ’* 
Some of this work addresses the popular concern that increased trading has 
helped promote greater volatility in financial markets. French and Roll (1  986), 
for example, have found that the variance of stock market prices is substan- 
tially higher when the market is open rather than when it is closed. This is true 
even for those days on which the market is closed but normal or larger than 
normal amounts of information are released (e.g., election days). 
Looking at exchange rate data, one is immediately skeptical of any long-term 
relationship between trading volume and volatility. Indeed, there is little evidence 
that exchange rate volatility is markedly higher today than over the past fifteen 
years. Table 8.4  presents simple calculations of the annual volatility of the dollar 
against the pound,  DM, and  yen over the floating rate period.  There  is little 
evidence of any upward trend in volatility to match the growth in trading volume. 
Perhaps, however, there is a great deal of high-frequency correlation between 
trading and volatility which gets lost when looking at longer-period averages. 
Because it is so difficult to measure trading in foreign-exchange markets, there 
have been no studies of the relationship between volume of trade and exchange 
rate volatility.  This gap can be filled, however,  by examining trading in ex- 
change rate futures, for which records of trading volume and transactions prices 
are available. By using transactions prices and trading volumes, we can gain 
a better sense for whether there is any basis to the allegations that trading volume 
itself generates exchange rate volatility. 
For a closer look at this question, we obtained transactions data on both price 
changes and the number of contracts traded over fifteen-minute intervals in five 
foreign-exchange  futures contracts (the pound, Canadian dollar, Swiss franc, 
deutschemark, and yen) each trading day during the period 1984- 1987. These 
are the highest-frequency exchange rate time series that I have seen used. Table 
8.5 presents summary statistics from these data. The lower part of  the table 
shows the average number of futures contracts traded every fifteen minutes. As 321  Multinational Corporations, Exchange Rates, and Direct Investment 
Table 8.4  Volatility of the Dollar Against Selected Currencies (in percent per 
annum) 
Currency 

































































Note: Volatility measures the standard deviation or monthly data, multiplied by  12 and expressed 
as a percentage. 
Table 8.5  Volatility and the Volume of Trade in Exchange Rate Futures 
Average % 
1984  1985  1986  1987  Increase  1984-87 






























































Note: Futures’ prices are from the Chicago Monetary Exchange. The data are sampled every fifteen 
minutes, beginning at 7:30 am until 12:30 pm each trading day. Annual estimates are averages over 
all trading days. Volatility is the average variance of  daily futures’ price changes, computed over 
the fifteen-minute intervals. Volume is the average number of futures contracts traded every fifteen 
minutes. 322  Kenneth A. Froot 
one might expect, trading volume grew steadily over the sample period. For 
some currencies, growth was very rapid:  volume  of  trade  in yen  grew  the 
fastest of  any currency, at an average annual rate of  22 percent. 
In the upper part of the table, we record the average variance of the futures 
prices over each year. Here the results are more mixed than in the lower part 
of the table. The variance grew most rapidly again for the yen, rising at an 
average annual rate of 16 percent. But in two of the five currencies, including 
the  DM,  the  variability  of  futures  prices  actually  declined.  The  simple 
correlation  between  variability  and volume of trade  across  these currencies 
(allowing each currency to have its own mean) is positive, but not statistically 
greater  than  zero.  There  is  thus  only  slight  evidence that  high-frequency 
volatility has increased with the volume of trade. 
There are, however, several problems to bear in mind when interpreting the 
numbers  in  these  last  two  tables.  First,  a  positive  relationship  between 
volatility and volume of trade need not imply that trading itself causes greater 
volatility.  We  cannot  give  a  causal  interpretation  to  positive  correlations 
because we expect that information  about fundamentals could increase both 
trading  and  volatility.  The  usual  presumption  behind  information-based 
correlations is that an improvement in the information content of prices allows 
more  efficient  risk  sharing, regardless  of  its  effect  on volatility.  But  new 
investors with new information  may also bring new noise to prices, so that 
increases  in  trading,  volatility,  and  the  flow  of  information  may  still  be 
associated with a reduction in welfare.  l3 Second, our measure of volume is the 
number  of  contracts  traded,  and  not  the  dollar value  of  those  contracts. 
Depending on one’s model of how trading and volatility interact, one may wish 
to measure  the dollar volume of  trade  instead.  Third, futures  contracts  are 
derivative, in that sense that futures prices are constrained by the behavior of 
the actual spot exchange rate and interest differentials. Even if  trading does 
itself generate volatility, we might not see any such relationship in table 8.5. 
If  the futures rate fluctuates for reasons  other than futures trading  (perhaps 
because  of  trading  in  the spot  market  that  is uncorrelated  with  trading  in 
futures) then we would expect variance to increase only on average with an 
increase in futures trading. 
One way to get around this latter problem is to regress the squared price 
change for each  fifteen-minute  interval  on the  volume  of  trade  over that 
interval. In doing this, we interpret the squared price change as a noisy estimate 
of the variance. This assumption would be problematic for standard time series 
samples, where the data are sampled less finely. Changing expected  returns 
could easily account for a large portion of  the variation in such series. But in 
finely sampled data, the stochastic component should dominate expected price 
changes.  l4  Thus high-frequency  squared  price changes are very nearly  un- 
biased  estimates of  the next  interval’s  conditional variance. The high  fre- 
quency of our time series is advantageous for another reason: for each currency 
we have at least 22,377 degrees of freedom! 323  Multinational Corporations, Exchange Rates, and Direct Investment 
The results of  regressions of the log of  the squared price change on the log of 
volume  are presented  in table  8.6. In  contrast  to the  secular averages in  the 
previous table, here the estimates indicate that volatility and volume of trade are 
positively related. All the coefficients are many standard errors from zero. There 
is some evidence, however, that the relationship between volatility and volume of 
trade is not stable. When we run the samples by year, as in table 8.7, we find that 
for several currencies in 1984 and 1985 the coefficient is negative, although it is 
not  statistically different  from  zero. For all currencies in  1986 and  1987, the 
relationship is strongly positive. 
Finally,  we  look  at  the  average  number of  transactions  and  the  average 
volatility by time of  day. Figure 8.3 shows the graphs of these series.  Both 
volatility and volume are high at the beginning of the day, then show a steady 
downward trend until they reach a low point at lunch time. After lunch, traders 
come back for an hour or so of vigorous trading, which reaches a peak at the 
close of the futures market. Volatility behaves similarly. It would seem hard 
to explain this pattern in daily volatility by arguing that the flow of information 
into the markets falls at lunch time or rises strongly during the last hour of 
trading. On the other hand, if much of the information reflected in prices must 
first be processed slowly by investors, then one might expect to see a decline 
in volatility during lunch and a rise thereafter. Of course, these daily patterns 
are also consistent  with the noise-trading  hypothesis, which would  say that 
there should not be much volatility when traders are busy eating. 
Overall, the positive relationship between volatility and the volume of trade 
is stronger for very high frequency fluctuations than for the lower-frequency 
secular averages reported in  tables  8.4 and  8.5. Why should  trading  itself 
generate additional  short-term volatility?  We  mentioned  earlier  that  trading 
could  be greater when more information  is reaching  the market. A  second 
explanation would be that traders have short-run “bandwagon expectations,” 
in  which  a current price increase by  itself generates expectations  of  further 
price increases. Trading on the basis of bandwagon expectations, which was 
the concern of Nurkse (1944), would today qualify as noise trading. If financial 
Table 8.6  Regressions of Volatility on Volume of  Trade 
t-test 
Currency  Years  a  b  (b=0)  DF  DW  R2  F-value 
Pound  1984-87  131  11.01  8.00  24,235  2.01  0.00  64 
Canadiandollar  1984-87  -4  6.73  27.86  23,326  1.95  0.03  776 
Swiss franc  1984-87  135  4.16  5.91  24,111  1.99  0.00  34 
Deutsche mark  1984-87  208  2.33  3.22  24,260  1.98  0.00  I1 
Yen  1984-87  13  7.32  13.04  24,284  2.01  0.01  I70 
Nore: Futures’ prices are from the Chicago Monetary Exchange. The data are sampled every fifteen 
minutes, beginning at 7:30 am until 12:30 pm each trading day. Volatility is the average variance 
of daily futures’ price changes, computed over the fifteen-minute intervals. Volume is the average 
number of futures contracts traded every fifteen minutes. 324  Kenneth A. Froot 
Table 8.7  Regressions of  Volatility on Volume of Trade 
t-test 
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Nore: Futures’ prices are from the Chicago Monetary Exchange. The data are sampled every fifteen 
minutes, beginning at 7:30 am until 12:30 pm each trading day. Volatility is the average variance 
of  daily futures’ price changes, computed over the fifteen-minute intervals. Volume is the average 
number of  futures contracts traded every fifteen minutes. 
market innovations, such as lower transaction costs, increase the frequency of 
such trades, then bandwagon  expectations may destabilize prices. 
While Nurkse’s concern has long been familiar, it is only recently that have 
we become better able to test it. The problem has been finding a valid measure 
of  the (unobservable) expected future spot rate. The usual presumption is that 
exchange rate expectations can be extracted from ex post spot rate realizations, 
but this strategy may not work in testing for bandwagon expectations. After 
all,  these  expectations may  not  be  rational,  or  they  may  be  rational  but 
disguised  by  peso problems or nonstationarity  in the ex  post  spot rate. The 
other  traditional  measure  of  expected  future  rates,  the  forward  rate,  is 
contaminated by the exchange risk premium. A third alternative, survey data 
on exchange rate expectations, are not subject to these problems, and in any 
case provide new information about the behavior of the market’s unobservable 
expectations. 
On the issue of  bandwagon  expectations, the surveys give a very  strong 
answer. Over short horizons of one week and one month, there are statistically 
significant  bandwagon  tendencies:  investors  tend  to  predict  that  current 
exchange rate changes will be extrapolated, and that current movements away 325  Multinational Corporations, Exchange Rates, and Direct Investment 
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from plausible  long-run  equilibrium values  will  continue.  l5  Froot  and  Ito 
(1989), for example, show that a 10 percent exchange rate appreciation over 
the  past  week  leads  investors  to expect  on  average  a  1.5 percent  further 
appreciation over the following week. Interestingly, however, the bandwagon 
effect  is reversed  for longer-term  forecasts. At  horizons  of  twelve  months, 
for example, a current appreciation of  10 percent generates expectations of a 
3.2 percent subsequent depreciation. 
The contrasting  behavior of  expectations at different  forecast  horizons  is 
difficult  to  square with the  predictions  of  any  single model. Froot  and  Ito 
(1989) test to see whether short-run and long-run expectations  are consistent 
with a single, autoregressive model. They reject this hypothesis. In addition, 
they find that a current, positive exchange rate shock leads agents to expect a 
higher  long-run  future  spot  rate  when  iterating  forward  their  short-term 
expectations than  when  thinking  directly  about  the  long run.  In this  sense 
short-horizon expectations may overreact to current exchange rate changes. 
One way of interpreting  these results is to think of agents using different 
models to forecast the spot rate at different horizons. Frankel and Froot (1988) 
discuss a  case  in  which  short-term  expectations come  out  of  “chartist” 
models, which are based on information only about past spot rates, whereas 
long-term expectations come from a “fundamentalist”  model which ignores 
past exchange rates and uses the information in present and future fundamen- 
tals.  This kind of  theoretical  explanation  combined with  the  results  above 
would  suggest  that  short-term  bandwagon  expectations are  destabilizing, 
whereas longer-term expectations are stabilizing. 
8.1.3  Corporations and Exchange Rate Volatility 
Within this framework, popular concerns about financial innovations leading 
to greater  volatility  seem more  believable.  But  note  that  not  all  financial 
innovations and agents are subject to this line of criticism. The above results 
suggest that  short-term volatility  and trading  are positively  related  and that 
short-term expectations may be destabilizing.  There is no evidence  that the same 
is true over long-term horizons. Indeed, the long-term survey data support the 
opposite contention, that trading at longer horizons is stabilizing. 
Corporations are, however, precisely the agents responsible for the dramatic 
rise in longer-horizon currency trading, as evidenced by the growth of the swap 
and international bond markets. Banks and individual investors rarely use these 
primary markets, trading instead  at shorter horizons  on secondary  markets. 
Spot currency traders at banks, for example, typically hold open positions only 
for short periods of time. Because of the paucity of other agents willing to take 
long  positions,  global  corporations provide  a  unique,  stabilizing  role  in 
currency determination. Indeed, while the international bond and swap market 
were in their infancy in the late 1970s, McKinnon (1979) identified a problem 
of  “insufficient  speculation.” He recognized  that while there were plenty of 327  Multinational Corporations,  Exchange Rates, and Direct Investment 
agents willing  to trade  at  short horizons, few at that  time took  long-term 
positions.  Financial  innovations  that  encourage longer-term  trading  would 
appear to strengthen the role of  fundamentals in determining exchange rates. 
Of course, this view does not imply that all innovations are for the better. 
Policymakers eager to restrict noise trading must be careful not to undo the 
benefits from speculation based on stabilizing expectations. The evidence in 
this section suggests that, to the extent that noise trading is a problem, it affects 
short-horizon trades more than long-horizon  trades. 
To  the extent that  financial  innovations have  allowed  multinationals  and 
large domestic corporations to trade more at longer horizons, these innovations 
may have a stabilizing effect on the exchange rate. Corporations appear more 
able  than  private  individuals  or  small  companies  to  take  advantage  of 
imperfections  in international  capital  markets  and more likely to  base their 
decisions on longer-term fundamentals. The arguments that exchange rates are 
too volatile may have some validity, but there is no evidence to support the 
contention that financial behavior of multinationals  has contributed to exces- 
sive volatility. 
A  number  of  economists advocate the  imposition  of  “Tobin”  taxes  on 
exchange rate transactions. It is important to note that if such taxes are applied 
to transactions in the international bond and swap markets, they will put U.S. 
firms at a cost-of-capital disadvantage, making it difficult to raise money in one 
currency and to spend it in another. As U.S. firms already complain that the 
U.S. tax law and institutional structure of  U.S. capital markets places them at 
a cost-of-capital disadvantage, such a tax might be very unpopular. And to the 
extent that it discourages firms from issuing or swapping long-term securities, 
it may reduce the amount of stabilizing speculation. 
8.2  Multinationals’ Foreign Investment Decisions 
As we mentioned earlier, there is a second channel by which multinationals 
influence  exchange rates:  through their  real  investment  decisions.  In  this 
section we briefly review  these effects. 
Consider for a moment a multinational based in the United Kingdom which 
has  a  new  low-cost  technology  for  casting  engine blocks.  The company 
recognizes there is a great demand for this technology in the United States and 
may choose to purchase facilities  near U.S.  auto manufacturers  in order to 
produce  the engine blocks  locally.  There are clearly  fixed,  nonrecoverable 
costs for the company to set up a new production  site in the United States. 
Denote these (dollar) costs by F, which  might include establishing  contacts 
with U.S. raw materials suppliers, shipping companies, local unions, costs of 
hiring top management, etc. Expressed in pounds, these costs are Fe, the dollar 
cost multiplied by the real price of  the dollar in terms of the pound. Clearly, 
if Fe is too high the firm would not wish to produce its product in the United 328  Kenneth A. Froot 
States. It  might  elect  instead  to produce the engine blocks  in  the  United 
Kingdom and export them,  for which  the firm incurs the  fixed  and nonre- 
coverable cost X. 
The firm’s decision to produce in the U.S. can affect exchange rates through 
a flow effect of  increased  domestic spending. Under a Keynesian  model  in 
which productive resources are not used to full capacity, if the firm adds to 
production in the United States, the result is an increase in U.S. investment 
spending, or a positive shock to the IS curve. The increase in spending tends 
to raise output and interest rates and to appreciate the dollar. Notice that if the 
U.K. firm were to purchase control of  an existing engine block facility in the 
United States, however, investment spending would not rise. There would be 
no effect on the dollar. 
The first point here is that FDI spent on new investments helps stabilize the 
real exchange rate. If there is a sudden real depreciation of the dollar-enough 
to generate expectations of future real appreciation-real  interest rates in the 
United  States will  be low, and foreign  firms will take advantage of  this by 
investing Fe in order to produce in the U.S. Firms already exporting to the 
United  States may  wish  to take advantage of  the low real  interest  rates by 
shifting some of their production into the United States. While low real interest 
rates are an incentive for all agents to invest in the United  States, the large 
differences in real interest rates across countries suggest that these incentives 
are not immediately arbitraged away. The presence of  more multinationals on 
the margin of investing can only help eliminate these differentials. Notice also 
that  improvements in  communications technology,  air transportation, etc., 
may lead to reductions in the fixed costs of  establishing a foreign production 
site. Such technical progress would tend to enhance multinationals’ stabilizing 
effects on exchange rate fluctuations. 
The second point concerns the volatility of future exchange rates. Lately, a 
number of  authors have focused on how  uncertainty about future exchange 
rates affects the decisions to export.I6 If our U.K. firm had chosen to export 
to the United States, a large depreciation  of the dollar would make the firm 
uncompetitive  enough to sustain losses and even to stop exporting. If  future 
exchange rates are uncertain, there is always a risk that exporting from the 
United  Kingdom  will  not  be  a  profitable  strategy.  The riskier  are  future 
exchange rates, the more reticent is the firm to commit to spending X  in order 
to begin exporting. Krugman (1988) points out that this effect may feed back 
to magnify the volatility of the exchange rate. As the exchange rate is more 
volatile,  firms are more reluctant to begin exporting. But as firms are more 
reluctant to export, the exchange rate must move by more to change the trade 
balance  by  a  given  amount.  Thus,  under  uncertainty  the  exchange  rate 
equilibrating  function fulfilled by trade flows is reduced. 
Foreign direct investment, however, is not as sensitive to uncertainty about 
future exchange rates. When our U.K. firm produces in the United States, it 
earns a profit, which from the U.K. firm’s point of view is subject to exchange 329  Multinational Corporations, Exchange Rates, and Direct Investment 
rate risk. If the U.K. firm produces in the United Kingdom, then its entire gross 
revenues, earned in the United States, are subject to exchange risk. But profits 
are only a tiny fraction of gross revenue. Thus the firm’s production location 
decision will be much less affected by uncertainty in the exchange rate than 
is its decision to trade as long as Fe is comparable toX. When the United States 
becomes a low-cost place to produce, foreign firms will take the opportunity 
to move more of their production there, even when the exchange rate is very 
volatile. The lower are the costs of relocating  production, F, the larger this 
effect  is  likely  to be.  Unlike trade  flows,  FDI’s  stabilizing  influence  on 
exchange rates is unlikely to be badly eroded by exchange rate uncertainty. 
8.3  Net Capital Flows and Foreign Direct Investment 
Charles Kindleberger once said that multinationals are about direct invest- 
ment and not about international  financial flows.  Yet there are a number of 
reasons why the separation is artificial. So far we have followed proposition  1 
of  MM in that we have assumed firms’  investment  and financing decisions 
are completely  separate. In practice,  however,  investment and financing de- 
cisions are rarely independent. Costs of capital across home and host countries, 
across firms, and across investment projects can and do vary. These differences 
can lead to important international financial flows. In this section we discuss 
two types of distortions which link investments and financing: segmentation 
of capital markets and taxes.  We then turn to assess the importance of these 
distortions in the recent experience of the United States. 
When investment  and  financing decisions are linked, multinationals  will 
have a portfolio effect on exchange rates. To  see this in our previous example, 
suppose that  the  United  Kingdom changed its  tax  rules to make FDI  tax 
preferred, and suppose that the firm’s cheapest  source of financial capital is 
cash  or liquid  assets that  it  has on hand.  Foreign  demand for U.S.-based 
production  facilities  would  increase  relative  to  U.S.  demand  for  those 
facilities.  The increase  in demand for U.S.  assets will appreciate  the dollar 
provided that the price of the plants, equipment, and real estate in the United 
States are relatively sticky. Notice that, unlike the flow effect above, this effect 
does not depend on new production facilities being built. The greater demand 
to buy existing U.S. facilities will itself tend to appreciate the dollar. Finally, 
notice  that  the  power and  presence  of  a  multinational  will  determine the 
importance of this effect. 
8.3.1  Capitzl Market Integration, The Cost of Capital, and Investment 
If capital markets are segmented, firms will have different costs of  capital 
depending on where they are located and to whom they sell their securities. 
Much as in the Eurobond example above, firms which can raise money from 
unsatisfied  clienteles  will have a lower cost of  capital  than other firms.  In 
countries with closed domestic capital markets, we would therefore expect to 330  Kenneth A. Froot 
see a positive relationship  between FDI and direct investment inflows in the 
balance of payments. 
Consider a small country which  is completely  closed to FDI and foreign 
portfolio  capital. What criteria  will a firm  operating  in that  country  use  to 
determine the investment projects it should undertake? If it can issue securities 
only to domestic residents, then the firm's  cost of capital will be determined 
in part by the domestic capital market. Because domestic residents are not as 
well  diversified  as foreign  investors  (who have  access to  the world  capital 
market), domestic residents will demand a higher return than foreign investors. 
Global firms which have access to international  capital markets will have a 
lower cost of  capital, and therefore will undertake more investment projects. 
An example may help to show this effect. Under the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) and assuming no taxes, a firm's cost of capital is equal to the 
riskless rate plus a term measuring the firm's  systematic risk: 
(6)  E(r)  = rf  + paw, 
where r- is the riskless rate of  return, p is the market price of risk (equivalent 
to the coefficient of relative risk aversion), R is the N  X  N covariance matrix 
of security returns, and w is an N  X  1 vector of market portfolio weights." 
The relevant set of N securities included in equation (6) will depend on which 
investors  are  purchasing  the  firm's  securities.  We  assume  that  domestic 
residents hold Nd securities in their portfolios and that world residents hold a 
disjoint set of N" securities. 
For simplicity, we let each asset comprise an equal share of domestic and 
world portfolios. In order to obtain ballpark estimates of  the cost of capital, 
we use the fact that the average return covariance of  two securities from the 
same country is about  1 percent (per year), and the average own variance of 
returns is about 15 percent. Basedon these numbers and equation (6), the firm's 
cost of capital from domestic residents  is 
(7)  1) + 0.151. 
Under the assumptions that p, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 2 and 
that rf = 0.07, equation (7) implies that the cost of  capital  from domestic 
residents is 11.8 percent for Nd = 10 and 10.1 percent for Nd = 25. 
The cost of capital for world residents can be calculated  in the same way. 
There are  only two changes. First  is  that  the  average  covariance between 
securities across countries is lower, about 0.5 percent. Second, world residents 
can hold better diversified portfolios. The firm's cost of capital in the world 
market would then be 8.3  percent if N"  = 100 and 8.0 percent if N"  = m. 
A global firm with access to the world capital market would find projects with 
returns between  8 and 10 percent to have positive net present value (NPV), 
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access to the world capital market is likely to lower a firm’s cost of capital and 
increase investment when capital markets are segmented. 
In this way, both the globalization of firms and the liberalization of domestic 
financial markets will tend to raise domestic investment. As with any other 
positive goods market shock, the effect is to generate a real appreciation. In 
this case, however, the increase in investment  spending is associated with a 
capital  inflow.  Countries  with  floating currencies will  experience a rise  in 
interest rates (for a given monetary policy) and a currency appreciation. For 
fixed rate countries, the mechanism is that of the “Dutch disease”: an increase 
in domestic spending leads to higher interest rates and a balance of payments 
surplus, which  in  turn  raises the domestic price  level. Either way,  as  the 
barriers of a restricted domestic capital market fall, real appreciation is likely 
to be the result. 
Of course, globalization is a slow process, reflecting the inexorable evolution 
of technology and the reduction in costs of moving production sites. Financial 
market liberalization, by contrast, can be sudden and deliberate. Thus countries 
that have liberalized rapidly have seen dramatic reductions in the cost of capital, 
and have witnessed  simultaneous  investment booms. In Chile, for example, 
investment went from 17 percent of GNP in 1979 to 24 percent two years later 
as the result of the liberalization of  its domestic financial markets and capital 
account. For Chile, as for several other developing countries, the rapid change 
was debilitating, as the real appreciation lead to expectations of depreciation, 
and therefore to even higher domestic interest rates. 
8.3.2  Exchange Rates, Taxation, and Investment 
Financing and investment decisions inevitably become blurred in the face 
of  corporate taxation.  In this  field, multinationals  operate in  an extremely 
complex environment and spend a great deal of resources  in tax planning. 
Taxes create distortions in international financial markets by affecting both the 
after-tax cash flows and the after-tax costs of raising funds for one national 
relative to another. Because tax effects are project- and financial-instrument- 
specific,  small changes in the tax code can lead to large changes in firms’ 
behavior.  As improvements in technology,  transportation, and communica- 
tions make multinationals more mobile internationally, home and host country 
corporate tax  codes necessarily  become more powerful  government instru- 
ments for influencing foreign investment by domestic multinationals as well 
as domestic investment by foreign multinationals.’’  In this section we give a 
brief overview of how corporate tax codes affect multinationals’ incentives for 
FDI . 
The most obvious effect on firms’ location choices comes from differing 
marginal tax rates across countries. By locating their headquarters in low-tax 
rate “havens,”  some firms can pay far less income tax on earnings repatriated 
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countries in effective corporate income taxation. lY  Multinational corporations 
in tax havens such as Bermuda paid an average effective tax of 0.5 percent of 
income in 1982, while those in Panama paid an average of  19 percent. These 
effective tax  rates  compare very  favorably  with the average rate  across all 
countries of  about 39 percent, and the 36 percent effective rate in the United 
States. 
The  evidence  that  multinationals  can  increasingly  take  advantage  of 
international tax havens is presented in table 8.8.*'  The share of  income of 
foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations that is earned in tax havens has almost 
doubled between  1968 and 1982, rising to about 20 percent of total before-tax 
income. It  is also clear from the  table that  multinationals  across  different 
industries differ in their ability to exploit the advantages of tax havens. 
One might guess that much of this income shifting is a result of creative 
accounting, and that it does not primarily  represent  an increase in physical 
investment in these countries. However, gross private fixed investment did rise 
in most of the tax haven countries from 1968 to 1982, on average by 3.5 percent 
of  GNP. Yet  in  absolute  terms,  this  does not  represent  a large amount of 
investment. 
It is likely that other tax practices have a greater impact on the choice of 
location for subsidiary affiliates. The most overt attempts to encourage foreign 
direct investment come from explicit subsidies and project-specific tax breaks. 
Host government  financial incentive packages  for investment are extremely 
common. For example, when Volkswagen  decided to locate assembly  oper- 
ations in the United  States, it received  subsidies valued at over $50 million 
from local, state, and federal governments, as well as a $1 .OO per hour wage 
concession from the U.A. W., which was worth an additional $40 million. The 
subsidies  included  municipal  interest  tax  subsidies, foreign  trade-zone  tax 
subsidies,  and  CETA  grants.2'  Not  all  subsidies to investment  and project 
financing require negotiation, however. The province of Quebec in Canada, for 
example, allows a 10 percent tax credit on salaries paid to research workers. 
Another  example is access to low-interest  borrowing, which  is a common 
subsidy to multinational investment in less-developed  countries. 
Table 8.8  Fraction of Before-Tax Earnings of  Foreign Affiliates of U.S. 
Multinationals Located in Tax Havens 
Industry  1968  1972  1980  1982 
All Industries  11.0  12.8  14.0  20.2 
Finance, insurance and real estate  30.4  35.5  42.5  NA 
Wholesale trade  21.5  34. I  22.4  NA 
Services  19.2  19.2  19.8  NA 
Other industries  7.3  6.2  6.2  NA 
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Direct  subsidization  of  investment,  either  explicitly  or  through  lower 
marginal tax rates is an overt means of altering incentives. There are, however, 
more  subtle  and  potentially  more  important  ways  that  taxes  can  effect 
multinational investment decisions. For example, the United States and many 
other developed countries grant to foreign affiliates of home corporations a tax 
credit on foreign income taxes paid. To a first approximation, the foreign tax 
credit  (FTC)  may  be thought of  as adding to the  incentives  for home cor- 
porations to invest abroad. However, this is only a first approximation because 
the incentive to invest in any given  host  country is a function  of  both  the 
home  and host  countries’ corporate income tax  codes. When the host  and 
home countries define income differently, taxes paid may not result in taxes 
credited.22 
These  tax  credits  have  several  important  effects on  multinationals  and 
governments. First, governments interested in foreign direct investment have 
an incentive to levy high income taxes-in  order to provide foreign firms with 
a larger FTC-while  at the same time offering offsetting non-income-based 
subsidies on investment. These subsidies may either lower the cost of capital 
for  the  investment  project,  or  may  directly  reduce  the  after-tax  cost  of 
investment. Countries (such as some in Western Europe) which rely heavily on 
value-added taxes (VATs) effectively reduce the incentives for foreign invest- 
ment, since VATs  are not usually refundable through foreign tax credits. 
Second, FTCs bias foreign corporations’  incentives toward investment  in 
heavily income-taxed investments. The U. S. affiliate of a foreign corporation 
can get no foreign tax credit on domestic investments that are sheltered from 
income taxes.  Yet, because these investments are preferred  by domestic in- 
vestors, they have lower rates of return. Thus if the foreign affiliate invests in 
tax-preferred items, it pays an implicit tax. International economists will rec- 
ognize this as an example of comparative advantage: because of the foregone 
FTC, tax-preferred  investments have a relatively  higher opportunity cost to 
foreign investors than to domestic investors. 
One implication of the FTC is that changes in the domestic tax code which 
discourage domestic investment in a certain type of asset, encourage foreign 
investment in that same asset. For example, the U.S. Tax Reform Act (TRA) 
of  1986  removes  several  investment  tax  credits  and  highly  accelerated 
depreciation rates. For U.S.  corporations this makes many investment projects 
less attractive in comparison with passive investments (such as CDs). Yet the 
incentives for foreign multinationals  to undertake those investment  projects 
improve. Scholes and Wolfson (1988) present data which indicate that in the 
four quarters following the 1986 TRA, mergers and acquisitions in the United 
States by foreigners ran at an annual rate of $46 billion.23  In the year prior to 
the tax reform act, mergers and acquisitions by foreigners came to only $12 
billion. Over the same period, mergers and acquisitions of U.S. companies by 
U.S. residentsfell by $33 billion, or about 16.5 percent. This would suggest 334  Kenneth A. Froot 
that the change in taxes  improved the  relative  profitability  of  takeovers  to 
foreigners while lowering it for domestic residents. It is striking that, although 
the tax changes were in part intended to discourage mergers and acquisitions, 
overall M&A activity increased by $1  billion in the year following the reform. 
Whether a foreign  firm should borrow  from its parent  or itself  in the U.S. 
market will also be determined by relative tax preferences.  If firms find assets 
within the firm to be a cheaper source of financing than selling securities on 
the open market or borrowing  from banks would be, then we would expect 
such an increase in M&A activity to be associated with capital inflows of direct 
investment. 
In addition  to receiving  a FTC on income earned abroad, U.S. multina- 
tionals may defer U.S. taxes on certain types of foreign-earned  income until 
it is repatriated  to the U.S.  parent.  Specifically,  if  majority-owned  foreign 
affiliates of U.S. corporations reinvest their foreign earnings in active invest- 
ments in host countries, where tax rates are often lower than in the United States, 
they need not pay U.S. income taxes, and can therefore shelter their interest 
earnings from U.S. taxes.  This means that  passive  investments  have  high 
implicit tax rates for foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations. This distinction 
between passive and active investments, made in Subpart F of the U.S. tax 
code, was enacted in  1962. A number of  other countries have  comparable 
measures. 
The policy  of  deferred  domestic taxation  combined with  the  FTC  also 
creates  an  incentive  for  U.S.  multinationals  to  repatriate  earnings  from 
high-tax countries and actively to reinvest earnings from low-tax countries. In 
these ways, the U.S. tax laws skew the incentives across foreign investment 
opportunities as well as the incentives for foreign versus domestic investment. 
The picture is further complicated, of course, once one takes into account the 
distortions created by foreign tax codes. 
The Tax Reform Act of  1986  clearly creates major changes in incentives for 
investment and capital inflows by foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals. And 
the 1986 TRA is already the fourth major U.S. tax reform bill in the 1980s! 
Add to this frequent changes in the tax laws of a multitude of countries in which 
multinationals  operate, and it is clear that  relative  investment  incentives  in 
different countries move frequently  due to changes in taxes. Each industrial 
country’s tax changes may now influence the investment decisions of all other 
countries’ multinational  foreign affiliates. 
8.3.3  Foreign Direct Investment Flows into the U.S. 
For most international economists, it is difficult to believe that changes in 
taxation  or in other capital  market  distortions can explain more than  a tiny 
fraction  of  either the  composition of  U.S.  capital inflows  or the  dollar’s 
unprecedented swings in the 1980s. Other observers, however, have been more 
bold. The dollar’s appreciation in the early 1980s is sometimes ascribed to the 
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Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) which purportedly raised the return on 
physical investments in the U.S.24 Economists have tended to discount these 
explanations because during the dollar’s appreciation there was little sign of 
a boom in investment  spending. 
This rules out much of  the flow effect on exchange rates discussed above. 
However, if there are substantial adjustment costs or other costs to increasing 
the capital stock, existing assets will provide a higher return than new assets 
do until their prices fully adjust. Indeed, ERTA is frequently cited for having 
given U.S. firms an incentive to “churn”  their assets, and is often credited 
with the subsequent boom in takeover activity by U.S. firms.25  In addition, the 
1984 repeal  of  interest  withholding  taxes  on U.S.  corporate bonds  issued 
abroad and the simultaneous  switch to bearer-bond  status for U.S. Treasury 
bonds  are  often  credited  with  causing  further  dollar  appreciation.  It  is 
interesting to note that the difference between U.S. and foreign interest rates 
fell during  this period, which  corresponds with  the predictions  of  this tax- 
change view of  the dollar. 
Data on FDI can  shed  light  on whether capital  inflows  (and  therefore 
potentially the exchange rate) were affected by major tax changes. Notice that 
the FDI data measure net purchases of new and existing assets. Thus, we might 
expect tax changes which affect old but not new asset values to show up in the 
balance of payments data even if those changes have little effect on investment 
in the national  income  accounts.  The FDI data, however,  do a poor job of 
measuring  what we would  like to know to gauge the ultimate effect of  tax 
changes on the exchange rate.  This would  require  information  on the  net 
increase in dollar exposure by foreign and U.S. multinationals.26 
Figure 8.4 shows FDI inflows into the United States in relation to U.S. GNP. 
It  is  clear that  the  inflow  has increased  substantially  in  the  1980s and  is 
particularly strong during periods of dollar depreciation. The generally higher 
inflows of  the 1980s coincide with the widening overall capital inflow into the 
United States. Note that there is a discernible increase beginning in the fourth 
quarter of  1986, when  the  1986 TRA was  passed.  (Recall  that  the  TRA 
lowered  foreign  multinationals’  relative  effective tax  rate  on  active  U.S. 
investments). In addition, there is a drop in the FDI inflow in 1981 when the 
ERTA was passed. By the same arguments we used earlier, ERTA was likely 
to  have raised foreign multinationals’  relative  effective tax  on active  U.S. 
investments. 
The major impression  created by figure 8.4, however,  is that of a strong 
upward trend. The increase in foreign ownership of U.S. corporations has led 
to much public controversy. Figure 8.5 shows that much of the commotion is 
misplaced.  The FDI inflow here is measured as a fraction of the total foreign 
capital inflow into the United States. The tendency toward greater FDI inflows 
is no longer apparent (except for the spurt around 1980, which is primarily due 
to a drying up of foreign private capital inflows). Indeed, it is clear that the 
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1981 tax change) are associated with a change in the composition of inflows 
toward portfolio investment  and away from direct  investment. FDI inflows 
have not kept pace with purchases  of U.S. bonds by foreigners. 
Naturally,  some argue that  the U.S.  external  deficits  should  have  been 
financed entirely by borrowing instead of by the sale of U.S. corporate control. 
They think that the FDI inflow  should not vary with total U.S.  borrowing. 
Malcolm Forbes is on the record as saying, "It's  one thing for Japanese and 
Germans and others to buy U.S. Government bonds to finance our huge trade 
imbalances . . . but it's a whole and totally impermissible other thing for them 
to use  their  vast  billions  of  dollars to buy  great  chunks of  America's  big 
businesses. . . ."*'  Even though the stock of FDI in the United States has risen 
rapidly-going  from 2 to 6 percent of GNP from 1979-87-it  is still below 
the  level of  many other countries in which the United  States is the  major 
foreign investor. 
Next we turn to U.S. FDI outflows. Figure 8.6 shows U.S. FDI abroad as 
a fraction of total U.S. private capital outflows. The steady downward trend 
is again a source of concern to some. But note the contrast with figure 8.7, 
which shows U.S. FDI abroad as a percentage  of U.S. GNP. Strikingly, the 
FDI outflow  is, by  this  measure,  larger  than  twenty-five  years ago.  The 
conclusion is  that  U.S.  direct  investment  abroad has  suffered  no  secular 
decline. The downward trend seen in figure 8.6 is instead an indication that 
U.  S. residents are taking advantage of foreign financial market liberalization 
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Figure 8.7 has two other important implications.  First, note that there is a 
large drop in FDI outflows beginning in 198  1. We might expect this from the 
ERTA changes, which increased U.S. multinationals’ relative effective tax rate 
on  foreign  investment  compared  with  domestic  investment.  The  Deficit 
Reduction Act of  1984 eliminated some of this by  increasing the depreciable 
lives  of  certain  assets and  by  removing the opportunity  to  postpone  the 
recapture of past depreciation through the use of installment sales.28  Second, 
note that the 1986 TRA led to a rapid resumption of high U.S. FDI outflows. 
This  reflects  the  increase  in  the relative  return  to  U.S.  multinationals  of 
investing in their foreign affiliates. 
It is worth mentioning that this corporate tax view of capital flows also has 
something  to  say  about  the  welfare  effects  of  FDI.  If  taxes  are  in  fact 
responsible for the recent increase in foreign ownership of U.S. businesses, it 
is the foreign taxpayer, not the U.S. taxpayer, who loses. In shifting toward 
more heavily  taxed  U.S.  investments, foreign  firms  add  to U.S.  Treasury 
receipts.  Because U.S. firms are shifting their investments abroad, this helps 
oifset lower tax revenues from U.S. firms. At the same time, foreign treasuries 
see  their  revenues  fall,  as  home-based  multinationals  qualify  for  more 
generous foreign tax credits. Foreign firms’ activities are thus subsidized by 
their own nationals, and the subsidy, in turn, is absorbed by the U.S. Treasury! 
Foreign taxpayers may end up paying to reduce the U.S. budget deficit. 
In sum, it appears that both U.S. direct investment inflows and outflows may 
be strongly affected by corporate tax changes. More work is needed  in this 
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area, as it would be interesting to study earlier tax changes. But it may be that 
we  have  entered  a  new  era  for  the  importance  of  taxes  in  determining 
international capital flows. International companies are more mobile than ever 
before. With  the innovations  in  financial  markets, they  can  respond  more 
rapidly and effectively to profitable investment opportunities. Whether it is a 
matter of  buying  a  few  shares in GM or all  of  Firestone  Tire and  Rubber 
(purchased by the Japanese-owned Bridgestone Corporation  for $2.6 billion 
early in 1988), more information  and capital resources are at the disposal of 
many  investors  worldwide.  The  same  tax  distortions  which  used  to  be 
dismissed as small and unimportant, may now appear large and critical for 
multinational investment. It would probably be wise to give more forethought 
to international capital flows when designing corporate tax policies. We have 
entered an age in which the financial multipliers of tax policy changes may be 
large. 
8.4  Conclusion and Summary 
Does the presence of large international corporations make the exchange rate 
more variable and difficult to control? This paper examines the potential effects 
that such corporations have on exchange rates and international capital flows. 
Section 8.1  of the paper looks at financial market innovations that have affected 
large corporations. It addresses the concerns of those observers who argue that 
financial  innovations  have  had  adverse effects on exchange rate  volatility. 
There is little evidence of such adverse effects, however. First, to the extent 
that Modigliani-Miller holds, changes in the capital structures of international 
firms should have no effect on underlying risks or exchange rates. Second, the 
most  important financial  innovations for large firms  are new  markets for 
securitized corporate borrowing and security swaps. These facilitate trading at 
longer horizons. The paper reviews, and finds no evidence that supports, the 
hypothesis  that  these  particular innovations  have  tended  to destabilize  ex- 
change rates. 
Sections 8.2  and 8.3 of  the paper look at how multinationals’ international 
investment  activities  might  conceivably  affect  exchange rates  and  capital 
flows.  One important route  is through  capital  market  imperfections. These 
imperfections  can create a difference  between the cost of  capital to certain 
multinationals  and to purely  domestic firms. The paper argues that cost-of- 
capital differentials may help explain international flows of direct investment. 
It  also argues that  the tax  systems in  industrialized  countries may  be  an 
important  source  of  cost-of-capital differentials.  This  part  of  the  paper 
discusses evidence which suggests that changes in corporate tax codes in the 
1980s have  had  a  visible  impact  on  U.S. direct  investment  inflows  and 
outflows. There is little evidence, however, that these capital flows have been 
important for exchange rate determination. 340  Kenneth A. Froot 
Notes 
1. See Lipsey (1988) for a survey of U.S. multinational trade and investment. 
2. It is interesting to note that it took economists a long time to understand this 
apparently obvious point. Mehra (1974) was the first to prove that the MM propositions 
also hold for a two-country capital market with stochastic exchange rates. 
3. Notice that borrowing and lending is not the only way for the investor to achieve 
payoffs equivalent to E$.  He could take a long position in a DM futures contract, which 
would replicate borrowing D,  dollars and lending the equivalent dollar amount of DM. 
4. See Frankel (1982), Froot (1988), Froot and Frankel (1989), and Hodrick (1987). 
5. In going from equation  (1) to equation  (2) we  use the fact that for normally 
distributed random variables, cov[f(x),y]  = f ’(x)cov(x,y). See Rubinstein (1976). We 
would get the same result even without normality if trading takes place continuously. 
6. For a complete survey of international financial innovation,  see Levich (1988). 
7.  These  restrictions  included  penalties  on  U.S.  banks  for new  loans  made  to 
foreigners and mandatory controls on capital transfers for U.S. corporations to their 
foreign affiliates. The controls discouraged both foreign borrowing from U.S. sources 
and repatriation of U.S.  profits from foreign sources. 
8. Mahajan and Fraser (1986) also find the average differential to be negative. In their 
1975-83  sample, however, the differential is not statistically different from zero. 
9. See Institutional Investor (1984, 1985). 
10. See Cooper (1986) for an in-depth discussion of financial market innovation. 
11. See, forexample, Shiller(1981), Campbell and Shiller (1986), andFroot (1988). 
Of course, these findings can never be conclusive because fundamentals may be moving 
in ways not captured by the models being tested, biasing the results toward finding 
“excessive”  volatility. 
12. See, for example, Black (1986). 
13. See Stein (1987), who presents a model in which the introduction of rational 
speculators destabilizes prices and lowers the welfare of other agents in the model. 
14. Continuous-time stochastic processes are of unbounded variation, which means 
that as the  sampling interval  shrinks to zero,  the fraction  of  price  variation due to 
stochastic changes converges to one. 
15. See Frankel and Froot (1988) for tests of these propositions. 
16. See Baldwin and Krugman (1987) and Krugman (1988). 
17. Equation (6) can be rewritten in the more familiar CAPM form as follows. Mul- 
tiplying  equation  (6)  by  w’,  the  vector  of  portfolio  weights,  gives  E(r,)  =rf  + 
pw’nw. Using this expression, equation (6) becomes 
where pi  is the usual covariance of the ith asset with the market divided by the variance 
of the market. 
18. For an interesting discussion of  these issues see Blumenthal (1987). 
19. See the discussion in Hines (1988), from which some of the following material 
20. In this table, countries designated as tax havens are the Bahamas, the Netherlands 
21. See Baldwin (1986) for a detailed analysis of the Volkswagen case. 
22.  Canada,  for  example,  permits  generous  depreciation  allowances  on  fixed 
investment. Because the U.S. law is stricter, a portion of a Canadian affiliates’ income 
would not  be  considered  income  in  the  United  States.  and  therefore  the  FTC  for 
is drawn. 
Antilles, Bermuda, Panama, Hong Kong, Liberia, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. 341  Multinational Corporations, Exchange Rates, and Direct Investment 
investments  in  Canada  is less  valuable  than  it  would  be  for investments  in  other 
countries. Even leaving these factors out, the ultimate effects on foreign investment of 
foreign tax are sensitive to a variety of assumptions.  See Hartman (1985) and Hines 
(1988). 
23. This is the total value of publicly traded stock purchased by foreigners in mergers 
and acquisitions of U.S. companies. To the extent that some of this was borrowed from 
third parties, the amount of FDI recorded in the balance of payments is smaller. 
24. Canto (1988) goes so far as to argue that changes in marginal tax rates explain 
the dollar’s entire 1981-84  appreciation, part of its 1985-87  depreciation, and all of 
its mid-I988 appreciation. 
25. Mergers and acquisitions by and of U.S. firms doubled between 1980 and 1981. 
See Gilson, Scholes, and Wolfson (1987). 
26.  The  FDI  data  on  inflows  report  increases  in  foreign  ownership  of  U.S. 
establishments that are either owned or acquired by foreigners. An establishment is 
considered foreign owned if a foreign entity owns more than 10 percent. Increases in 
ownership are defined net of  all borrowing, unless the borrowing is done through the 
foreign parent.  Tax changes will not create capital inflows to finance foreign direct 
investment if the cost of capital to foreign firms is lowest in the United States. 
27. Quoted in Tolchin (1988). 
28. See Scholes and Wolfson (1988). 
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COm~eIlt  Geoffrey Carliner 
Since the end  of  fixed  exchange rates  in  the early  1970s, the  dollar has 
fluctuated dramatically in relation to other major currencies. Especially during 
the 1980s, the real as well as the nominal value of the dollar has varied sharply. 
Partly as a result, the U.S.  trade deficit has become a serious problem; finance 
ministers from the G-  7 countries have met regularly to discuss exchange rate 
coordination; and economists have written  volumes like the present one to 
review past attempts at coordination and examine possible future efforrs by 
major countries to keep their currencies in line. 
One  common  response  to  critics  of  the  floating  rate  system  is  that 
international capital flows are now too large for a fixed rate system to function 
successfully. In the 1960s virtually all countries had controls on capital flows, 
and defending currencies against speculative attacks was within the power of 
central banks. In the 1980s, according to some supporters of the floating rate 
system, capital markets in the industrial economies are so integrated that a 
fixed rate system is no longer possible. 
It is clear from Ken Froot’s analysis that multinationals, acting as producers 
of  goods and  services in  many countries,  have not  played a large part  in 
the exchange rate fluctuations of the 1980s. If  anything, their foreign direct 
investments have tended to stabilize the long-run value of  the dollar. In any 
event, foreign direct investment by multinationals is dwarfed by international 
flows of portfolio capital. If international capital flows have in fact destabilized 
exchange rates or made fixed rate systems unworkable, it is clearly the actions 
of  financial institutions rather than multinationals that are responsible. 
One fact cited by  Froot and by  Goodhart (1987) brings this point home: 
90 percent of the trading in foreign-exchange markets is between banks, and 
only 10 percent is between banks and their customers. It is this huge flow of 
assets across international borders,  done primarily by  banks for their own 
account, that makes a fixed exchange rate system so hard to imagine. 
Other  financial  institutions besides  banks  have  also  become  important 
players in foreign-exchange markets during the past decade. Thanks to capital 
market liberalizations, Japanese insurance companies and pension funds have 
joined American mutual funds, Swiss banks, and Dutch investment trusts in 
the buying and selling of foreign portfolio capital. Ten years ago there were 
tight limits on the percentage of  assets which Japanese fund managers could 
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invest abroad. Today these limits are much higher. Ten years ago, U.S. mutual 
funds had a much smaller share of U.S. financial assets, and they invested only 
a tiny fraction of their portfolios abroad. Today, U.S.  mutual funds have a 
larger share of total financial assets, and a significantly higher fraction is in 
foreign stocks and bonds. 
It is true that multinationals can speculate in foreign-exchange  markets along 
with  financial institutions.  The actions of  Exxon and  Pepsico  in  Eurobond 
markets, cited by Froot, are good examples. By moving their liquid assets from 
one country  to  another  in  response  to  interest  differentials  and  expected 
exchange rate movements, multinationals as well as banks and other financial 
institutions now  make the job of maintaining  fixed exchange rates far more 
difficult.  However,  when  they  engage  in  these  transactions,  they  are  no 
different from other owners of financial assets and are not acting as multina- 
tionals, in Froot’s words, as companies which manage production facilities in 
more than one country. 
Foreign investments by multinationals may in fact respond to exchange rate 
fluctuations,  but  in  a  way  that  would  dampen  rather  than  amplify  these 
fluctuations.  In another paper with Stein (1989), Froot reports that FDI into 
the United States increased by $5 billion for every 10 percent fall in the value 
of the dollar between  1973 and  1988. The dollar’s decline is thus associated 
with  an  increase  in demand for dollars  by  multinationals  who wish  to buy 
nonfinancial U.S. assets. This increase in demand for dollars by multinationals 
will of course tend to offset the decline in the dollar’s value. Froot and Stein 
suggest that this increase in FDI is the result of the greater ability of  foreign 
firms to obtain external financing for their investments when the dollar value 
of their equity rises as a result of the fall in the dollar exchange rate. 
When multinationals  enter foreign-currency  markets  in  their role as pro- 
ducers, either to invest abroad or to repatriate earnings, they are likely to be 
motivated by factors other than exchange rate speculation or to lean against it. 
Hines and Hubbard (1990) have shown that tax considerations  dominate the 
timing of repatriation  of foreign profits by U.S. multinationals.  Under U.S. 
law, profits earned abroad are not taxed until they are repatriated.  Hines and 
Hubbard found that U.S. multinationals  waited to bring their overseas profits 
home until they could use foreign tax credits to minimize the taxes owed to 
the U.S. government. Repatriation was thus not sensitive to fluctuations in the 
value of  the dollar but rather depended on their profits  and tax liabilities at 
home and abroad. 
As Froot points out in the present  paper, the possibilities  of international 
coordination of tax policies  may be at least as great as the possibilities  for 
international coordination of exchange rates. Without coordination, multina- 
tionals and other owners of capital can exploit international differences in tax 
codes to minimize their taxes.  Countries that are too small to be  important 
producers  or consumers of  the  products  of  multinationals  can serve as tax 
havens  that  allow  these  firms  to avoid  taxes  in  all  countries. A  failure  to 345  Multinational Corporations, Exchange Rates, and Direct Investment 
coordinate among countries can even lead to tax competition of the sort that 
has sometime plagued groups of  states in the United States. 
Froot’s paper conclusively answers the question which he set out to answer: 
multinational corporations acting as producers of goods and services in more 
than  one  country  do  not  tend  to  increase  exchange  rate  fluctuations. If 
anything, they tend to dampen these fluctuations. Rather, it is the loosening of 
capital  controls  and  the  growth  of  financial  institutions  that  has  made 
international exchange rate  coordination more  difficult if  not  impossible. 
However, the growth of multinationals does raise questions about the need for 
international coordination of tax policies. Those issues certainly deserve some 
of the attention which exchange rate coordination has received during recent 
years. 
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Comment  J. S. Flemming 
This wide-ranging paper touches on many related issues to which it contributes 
either analytical insights or novel data. It thus clarifies areas which are subject 
to  widespread confusion, mystery, and prejudice.  Its range  does however 
diminish the structure of  the argument and the coherence of  its conclusions 
which are scattered through the text. 
I have half a dozen comments, some on what Kenneth Froot has said and 
two on themes he might have been expected to address but did not-at  least 
explicitly. 
Among the financial developments of recent years has been an increase in 
securitization as the LDC debt problem reduced the credit worthiness of many 
banks relative to their corporate customers. This has led to disintermediation 
as the margin available to banks narrowed or disappeared. Notice, however, 
that a guarantee even from an inferior source adds to the value of any security 
as long as there is a chance that the guarantor will suriive some events leading 
to default by  the primary issuer. 
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This is the basis of the acceptance business on which the London merchant 
banks  were  built  and  also plays  an  important  role  in  explaining modern 
currency and interest rate swaps. 
Froot argues correctly that exchange rate instability militates more strongly 
against trade than foreign direct investment, but he does not draw out the point 
that much of the undeterred FDI displaces the deterred trade. Moreover, FDI 
itself is likely to be reduced to the extent that in the absence of exchange risk 
a U.K. firm might have planned  to meet Pacific demand from a U.S. plant. 
Again, in the risk area, the comparison of open and closed economies is not 
straightforward.  In a closed economy with limited scope for diversification, 
people may save more and depress the return on safe (or indeed any given risk 
level  of) investment below  that  available  elsewhere,  contrary  to  Froot’s 
implicit assumption of a uniform  safe rate. 
It is sometimes suggested that because multinational corporations are more 
sensitive to relative costs in, for example, their sourcing decisions than other 
firms are, they  contribute  to closer adherence to PPP. Though they may be 
assumed  to  have  the  relevant  information,  so  may  international  buying 
agencies, and multinational  corporations’ plants in different countries are as 
subject  to the  costs of  adjustment  of  switching production  as  any  others. 
Moreover, to the extent that they have market power, they may be even better 
placed  to discriminate in  their pricing  between  different  markets-as  the 
automobile industry in particular shows. 
On the more general question  whether financial innovation  by enhancing 
hedging opportunities reduces the effectiveness  of interest and exchange rate 
policies, I think that a negative answer would be consistent with the thrust of 
Froot’s  arguments.  Such instruments may  eliminate the income effects of 
unexpected developments but do nothing to blunt their substitution effects. 